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Comments and Casenotes
Unreasonable 'Searches And 'Seizures And The
Admissibility Of Evidence In Maryland
Mapp v. Ohio'
By JOHN MICHENER
The decision of the Supreme Court of the United States
in the case of Mapp v. Ohio promises to have a far-
reaching, if as yet not completely ascertainable, effect on
the administration of criminal justice in the states. Cleve-
land police came to the defendant's home after receiving
information that a man wanted for questioning in con-
nection with a bombing was hiding there and that there
was a large amount of policy paraphernalia ("numbers"
game materials) hidden in the house. The defendant re-
fused to admit the officers until they had a search warrant.
Several hours later, claiming possession of a search war-
rent, which, however, was never produced nor accounted
for at the defendant's later trial, the officers forcibly
opened a door and entered the house, which was then
completely searched. Although the police found neither
the fugitive nor any evidence of policy activities, they did
find obscene matter2 left by a recent boarder. Based at
least in part on this evidence, the defendant was tried
for and convicted of knowing possession of obscene matter.
Following affirmation of the conviction by the Ohio Su-
preme Court,3 on the ground that evidence obtained by an
unlawful search and seizure is admissible in a state crim-
inal proceeding, the defendant appealed to the Supreme
Court. The Supreme Court reversed the conviction, holding
that evidence secured by unreasonable searches and
seizures is inadmissible in state courts. Since evidence
secured by unreasonable searches and seizures is also
inadmissible in the federal courts,4 determination of what
constitutes an unreasonable search and seizure now be-
comes crucial. This is particularly true for the bench and
bar in those states where unreasonably seized evidence
has until now been admissible in the state courts.
1367 U.S. 643 (1961).
2 Four pamphlets, two photographs, and a pencil doodle.8
,State v. Mapp, 170 Ohio St. 427, 166 N.E. 2d 387 (1960).
'Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
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The full impact of the present doctrine can best be
seen when the doctrine is viewed in its historical setting.
The common law position on the issue was set forth in
the case of Entick v. Carrington.5 In that case the court
held that evidence obtained by illegal searches was ad-
missible, but also allowed Entick to recover damages for
the unlawful search. Thus at common law an illegal
search and seizure was a collateral matter that did not
affect the admissibility of evidence in court. The basis for
this policy was a strong conviction that the interests of
society required that there be brought to bear in a trial
all material that would be helpful in determining the point
at issue. The party adversely affected by an illegal seizure
of evidence was not without a means of redress, for he
could institute actions to secure return of the seized
material provided his possession of it would be lawful,
and he could sue for such damages as were recoverable
on the basis of the tort perpetrated in the illegal seizure.
In the United States the common law rule was at
first followed on both the federal and state levels. The
adoption of the United States Constitution and of the Bill
of Rights, including the Fourth Amendment prohibition
against unreasonable searches and seizures,6 did not bring
any immediate change, since the Fourth Amendment was
not regarded as changing the old rule that admissibility
of evidence was not affected by its obtention through an
illegal search and seizure.7
In 1886 in the case of Boyd v. United States8 the Su-
preme Court rejected the common law doctrine with re-
gard to searches and seizures in violation of the Fourth
Amendment. Boyd, charged civilly with a violation of
the custom laws, was compulsorily required to produce
his private books and papers which were then used in
evidence against him. The Court held that the Fourth
and Fifth Amendments were so related historically that
they had to be considered in conjunction with each other.
As a consequence, evidence seized in a search and seizure
unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment was ex-
cludable under the Fifth Amendment protection against
self-incrimination in criminal cases.9 The Court regarded
619 Howell State Trials 1029 (1765).
6 "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated .... " U.S. CONST., amend. IV.
See 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE (McNaughton rev. 1961) 31, § 2184a.
8 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
9 "No person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself.... ." U. S. CONST., amend. V.
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the civil forfeiture involved in the Boyd cases as the
equivalent of a criminal penalty. This breach in the
common law doctrine was thus based in part on the Fifth
Amendment restriction against self-incrimination. °
Since the Fourth and Fifth Amendment restrictions
are addressed solely to the federal government, the Boyd
case left the states free to follow the common law doc-
trine without change. Many of the states, including
Maryland, had provisions similar to those of the Fourth
and Fifth Amendments in their own constitutions," so
that these states could have followed the Boyd doctrine
had they so desired. The doctrine, however, was exten-
sively questioned in the state courts 2 and was rejected by
Maryland. I3
The questioning by state courts achieved its greatest
impact in 1903 in the case of People v. Adams 4 involving
a search by warrant for policy slips, which were found
and seized pursuant to the warrant, as were some private
papers not described in the warrant. In the subsequent
trial Adams objected to the introduction of these latter
papers into evidence on the basis of their conceded illegal
seizure. The New York Court of Appeals took the common
law position that the legality of the seizure was collateral
to the issue on trial and refused to exclude the evidence.
Adams' subsequent conviction was affirmed by the Su-
preme Court."5 The affirmation was made by distinguish-
ing Boyd. In the Boyd case, the Court said, the defendant
had had to produce private papers under process and was
virtually compelled to furnish testimony against himself.
In the Adams case, by contrast, there was a search for
evidence of a particular crime under a valid search war-
rant, so that the illegal seizure of additional evidence
incidental to the valid search did not constitute compul-
sory self-incrimination. Consequently, the illegally seized
evidence was held admissible. Although the Court stated
"Cf., Justice Black's concurring opinion in the instant case, 367 U.S.
643, 661 (1961).1 1 
"[No man ought to be compelled to give evidence against himself in
a criminal case." MD. CONST., DEC. or RIGHTS, art. 22.
"[All warrants, without oath or affirmation, to search suspected
places, or to seize any person or property, are grievous and oppressive;
and -all general warrants to search suspected places, or to apprehend
suspected persons, without naming or describing the place, or the
person in special, are illegal, and ought not to be granted." MD. CONST.,
DEC. or RIGHTS, art. 26.
See 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE (McNaughten rev. 1961) 6, § 2183.
I Lawrence v. 'State, 103 Md. 17, 63 A. 96 (1906).
u 176 N.Y. 351, 68 N.E. 636 (1903).
15 Adams v. New York, 192 U.S. 585 (1904).
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that Boyd had been "frequently cited by this court and
we have no wish to detract from its authority,"'6 the
decision was a virtual repudiation of Boyd and readoption
of the common law rule.
Ten years later, in 1914, the Supreme Court in Weeks
v. United States" returned in major essentials to the
doctrine of Boyd. In Weeks, federal and state officers en-
tered a home without a warrant and seized private letters
concerning Weeks' connection with a lottery. The seizure
of the letters being in violation of the Fourth Amendment,
the Court ruled the evidence inadmissible in a federal
court with the express purpose of reducing the temptation
to ignore the constitutional restraints on searches and
seizures.18
Although Weeks influenced a number of states,19 this
was not the case in Maryland, where the Court of Appeals
on reconsideration of the issue refused to adopt the
Weeks rule and reaffirmed Maryland's adherence to the
common law position.20
Compulsory application of the exclusionary doctrine of
the Weeks case was limited to the federal courts by the
case of Wolf v. Colorado.2' There, a state officer illegally
searched a doctor's office and seized his appointment books.
Evidence discovered from leads in the books and the books
themselves were introduced in evidence. Although the
Supreme Court held that the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment 22 prohibited unreasonable searches
and seizures on the part of the states, it further held that
the unconstitutionality in the obtention of the evidence
did not require its exclusion in a state criminal trial. The
states were left free to enforce the constitutional guarantee
in the manner they thought best, whether by exclusion,
by criminal prosecution of persons violating constitutional
guarantees, or by other means.
With Wolf establishing that unreasonable state searches
and seizures violate the Fourteenth Amendment, and with
- Id., 597.
1232 U.S. 383 (1914).
18 In order to prevent diversion of a trial court's attention during trial
to the collateral issue of the legality of proffered evidence. Weeks im-
posed the procedural requirement that the illegality of a search and
seizure must be directly raised by a pre-trial motion and litigated before
commencement of the main trial.
1See the appendix to the opinion in Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 33-39
(1949).
2 Meisinger v. State, 155 Md. 195, 199, 141 A. 536 (1928).
21338 U.S. 25 (1949).
2"No State shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law." U.S. CONST., amend. XIV, § 1.
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Weeks excluding in federal trials evidence unconstitu-
tionally seized by federal officers, the way was clear for
the Court to reconsider the silver platter doctrine. Under
that doctrine evidence illegally seized by state officers was
not excluded in a federal trial unless a federal officer was
involved in the perpetration of the wrong. In Elkins v.
United States28 evidence of private wire taps was unlaw-
fully seized by state officers. The evidence was sup-
pressed by the state court because of the unlawful seizure.
Following abandonment of the state prosecution, the evi-
dence was obtained by federal officers and made the basis
for federal prosecution. After reviewing the doctrine and
its history, the Supreme Court repudiated it and excluded
the evidence, relying primarily on its power over the ad-
ministration of justice by lower federal courts.
With the adoption of the Elkins rule, the permissible
use of illegally seized evidence was mainly restricted to
state trials where the evidence had been seized by state
officers, such use being protected by Wolf. The last im-
portant remaining area of application of the common law
rule of admissibility of illegal evidence was then over-
turned by the instant case, Mapp v. Ohio.
The reversal of Wolf promises to eliminate a very
troublesome "gray" area of constitutional adjudication
where subjective elements were so intertwined as to al-
most eliminate any predictability in adjudication. The
Wolf approach had led to the drawing of a distinction
between admissible and inadmissible evidence predicated
upon whether the seizure of the evidence was under such
shocking circumstances that its admission would violate
due process of law. Thus, in Rochin v. California,4
forcible pumping of an emetic into the defendant's
stomach so that the desired evidence, swallowed narcotics,
was vomited, was held to so "shock the conscience" as to
make the evidence inadmissible. By contrast, evidence
from repeated illegal entries into a home and the con-
cealment of a microphone so that every word said in
defendant's household for over a month was recorded,
was admitted in Irvine v. California,2 which distinguished
Rochin on its facts due to the absence of physical assault
upon the person of the defendant. A measure of physical
force was necessarily involved in Breithaup v. Abram, 26
-364 U.S. 206 (1960).2342 U.S. 165 (1952).
- 347 U.S. 128 (1954).
352 U.S. 432 (1957). See Burgee, A Study of Chemical Tests for
Alcoholic Intowication, 17 Md. L. Rev. 193 (1957).
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where a blood sample was taken from the unconscious
defendant, but this was held not to shock the conscience
and was therefore admissible. The troublesome deter-
mination of what so "shocks the conscience" as to violate
due process if the evidence is used has been replaced by
the current test of the unreasonableness of the search or
seizure leading to the obtention of the evidence."
Although Mapp v. Ohio eliminates this cause of un-
predictability as to the use of evidence obtained in a
search or seizure by state officers, it leaves room for a
possible distinction between illegally seized evidence and
unconstitutionally seized evidence. Pugach v. Dollinger,28
decided by the Court earlier in the same term as the Mapp
case, indicates a probability that the Court may not apply
the Mapp rule to evidence illegally seized in a constitu-
tionally proper search. In the Pugach case the Court
affirmed per curiam a lower court decision that a federal
court should not enjoin state officers from divulging wire-
tap evidence in state criminal trials, even though intro-
duction of such evidence would constitute a violation of
federal criminal statutes pertaining to wire tapping.2"
Pugach relied on Schwartz v. Texas,30 and Stefanelli v.
Minard.1 Schwartz held that the Communications Act
32
prohibition against wire tapping does not exclude in state
court proceedings evidence obtained by wire tapping.
Stefanelli held that federal courts should refuse to inter-
vene in state criminal proceedings to suppress use of
evidence claimed to have been secured by unlawful search
and seizure.
Uncertainty remains, because of the blending of
Stefanelli and Schwartz as support for the per curiam
opinion in Pugach, as to what the federal courts would
now do if faced again, as in Schwartz, with the question
of whether evidence obtained constitutionally but in vio-
lation of federal law can be used in state court proceedings.
Under Stefanelli, upon which Mr. Justice Brennan would
have relied solely in Pugach, federal courts should be
reluctant to interfere with state court proceedings, allow-
'The new Mapp test of unreasonableness should exclude in all cases In
which Rochin's "shock the conscience" test excluded, since the Rochin test
required an unreasonable search and seizure plus an act that "shocked the
conscience," e.g., brutality, while the Mapp test excludes for an unrea-
sonable search and seizure alone.
365 U.S. 458 (1961).
1Pugach v. Dollinger, 277 F. 2d 739 (2d Cir. 1960).
344 U.S. 199 (1952).
a342 U.S. 117 (1951).
48 Stat. 1103 (1934), 47 U.S.C.A. § 605 (1958).
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ing the Supreme Court to correct the admission of il-
legally seized evidence insofar as federal issues are involved
when reviewing the case on appeal from the state courts. 3
There is a possible incidental result of the Mapp case
that should not be overlooked. One effect in some states
that had adopted the Weeks 4 exclusionary rule prior to
Mapp was an apparent relaxation by the courts of consti-
tutional standards. Rather than exclude evidence formerly
admissible even though unconstitutionally obtained, some
courts had responded by holding the evidence to have been
obtained constitutionally, and so to be admissible. 5 The
significance of such possible relaxation of state standards
disappears after the Mapp case, which makes all evidence
obtained in violation of the federal constitution constitu-
tionally inadmissible in the state courts, and thus more
closely subjects all of the states to check by the federal
courts.
With the Mapp case imposing Fourth Amendment
standards through the Fourteenth Amendment36 it be-
comes important to note briefly the federal standards on
searches and seizures, the trend of their development, and
their similarity with Maryland law. A basic rule of law
for searches and seizures is that a search of a house is
invalid in absence of a valid search warrant or a preceding
valid arrest.3 T Both Maryland and the federal government
require probable cause for the issuance of a search war-
rant. A Maryland statute requires that before a search
warrant shall issue there must be a written application
8This procedure in such circumstances was approved by the Supreme
Court in Wilson v. Schnettler, 365 U.S. 381 (1961). The situation involved
in Schnettler should be distinguished from the situation involved in
Rea v. United States, 350 U.S. 214 (1956). In Rea the petitioner, under
federal indictment, moved to have the evidence suppressed because of its
illegal seizure. Following the suppression of the evidence by the federal
court and the enjoinment of its use in "any hearing or trial", the federal
agent who had seized the evidence sought to transfer the illegally seized
evidence to state authorities for use in a state prosecution based thereon
and to give testimony with respect to the evidence. The Supreme 0ourt
held that the power of the federal courts in policing the enforcement of
federal rules permitted enjoining use of evidence in state courts where
such use was in violation of a prior federal injunction based on an express
federal rule. As to the effect of Pugach, see Williams v. Ball, 294 F. 2d
94 (2d Cir. 1961) and its suggestion that it is unfortunate that Congress
has not acted on the many proposals to clarify the wire-tap situation.
"Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
8 See 8 WI0MoRE, EvimENcE (McNaughton rev. 1961) 52, § 2194a, n. 44.
8The Mapp dissent recognized this and expressly objected to the
majority holding Imposing the "federal substantive standards of 'search
and seizure.'" 367 U.S. 643, 680 (1961).
v1 Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961); Miller v. United
States, 357 U.S. 301 (1958) ; Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20 (1925);
HI v. State, 190 Md. 698, 59 A. 2d 630 (1948).
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sworn to by the applicant and indicating probable cause to
believe a crime is being committed.s8 Before 1958 it was
sufficient if the stated facts were verified by the applica-
cant's oath based on information and belief, if the facts
and sources of information on which the belief was based
were stated." Since 1958 the applicant has had to swear
the facts stated are within his personal knowledge.4" No
cases have been reported yet under the amended require-
ment. In the federal courts, by contrast, hearsay may
constitute probable cause for issuance of a search warrant
so long as a substantial basis for crediting the hearsay is
present.41 In this area the Maryland statutory require-
ments for search warrants are stricter than federal con-
stitutional standards, so the distinction between illegally
obtained evidence and unconstitutionally seized evidence
may be important in Maryland.
In other areas federal and Maryland standards are
identical. Persons may be searched pursuant to a lawful
arrest,42 and the search may extend to articles within the
arrested person's use and immediate control and posses-
sion.4 3 The Supreme Court upheld a search extending to
an immediate one-room office, including desk, safe, and
file cabinets, under control of the person arrested but in a
room open to the public,4 4 and a search, pursuant to an
arrest, extending to a complete four room apartment.45 This
compares to a Maryland case where an officer was held
to have properly searched a house as an incident to an
arrest therein, the officer having seen a crime being com-
mitted in the house and having lawfully entered to make
8 3 M . CODE (1957) Art. 27, § 551.
1 Burrell v. State, 207 Md. 278, 113 A. 2d 884 (1955).
'
0 MD. LAWS 1958, ch. 74; 3 MD. CODE (1961 Cum. Supp.) Art. 27, § 551.
"Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960). In this case an affidavit
reciting the following items was held to give sufficient evidence of probable
cause: (1) affiant had received information from an unnamed informer
that defendant was engaged in illicit traffic in narcotics and that the
informer had purchased narcotics from the defendant, (2) that previous
information from this informer had been correct, (3) that the same
information had been received from other unnamed sources, (4) that the
defendant was known to be a drug addict, and (5) that affiant believed
defendant was hiding drugs.
42 Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307 (1959) ; Weeks v. United States,
232 U.S. 383 (1914) ; Davids v. State, 208 Md. 377, 118 A. 2d 636 (1955).
'5Marron v. United States, 257 U.S. 192 (1927) ; Agnello v. United States,
269 U.S. 20, 30-31 (1925), right to search incident to arrest does not allow
search of a man's dwelling several blocks from place of arrest; Davids v.
State, 8upra, n. 42, right to search extends 'to automobile; Brown v. State,
207 Md. 282, 113 A. 2d 916 (1955); Callahan v. State, 163 Md. 298, 162
A. 856 (1932).
"United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950).
'
5 Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145 (1947).
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a valid arrest.46 On the other hand, the valid arrest of
persons immediately outside a house was held by the Su-
preme Court not to validate arrest of persons in the house
nor, by itself or in conjunction with the latter arrest, did
it validate search of the entire house and seizure of the
entire contents. 7 Insofar as searches pursuant to an arrest
are concerned, there appears to be no conflict between
Maryland and the federal standards under the Fourth
Amendment.
An area of difficulty, and one where the federal posi-
tion appears to be vacillating, is that of determining when
there must be a warrant for a search to be justified. In
1948, Johnson v. United States" and Trupiano v. United
States49 held that a search of premises following an arrest
thereon was not justified if it would have been practicable
to obtain a search warrant before the arrest. Then in
1950 United States v. Rabinowitz" overruled Trupiano and
severely impaired Johnson by implication. According to
Rabinowitz, the necessity for a search warrant was not
to be determined by the practicability of obtaining a
warrant, but by the reasonableness of the search that
followed the arrest. Although Rabinowitz was not re-
versed, its standing was impliedly called into question in
1961 by Chapman v. United States.51 In Chapman state
officers acting without a warrant entered defendant's rented
house through an unlocked window with the permission of
the owner who had summoned them after detecting the
odor of whiskey mash. When defendant returned, he was
arrested by the state officers and then turned over to
federal officers who arrived shortly afterwards. Defend-
ant's conviction in federal court for violating the federal
liquor laws followed. Finding that the owner had no
authority under the circumstances to authorize the entry
and search, and that there was no reason for not obtaining
a search warrant except the inconvenience to the officers
and some slight delay, the Supreme Court held the search
and seizure of evidence unreasonable. The rationale used
was that of Trupiano, but Trupiano was never mentioned.
Neither was there any attempt to distinguish Rabinowitz.
" Griffin v. State, 200 Md. 569, 92 A. 2d 743 (1952).
'
7 Kremen v. United States, 353 U.S. 346 (1957).
"333 U.S. 10 (1948).
"334 U.S. 699 (1948).
Supra, n. 44.
1365 U.S. 610 (1961). "[T]he decision in this case runs counter to
[United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950)]." Frankfurter, con-
curring, it., 618.
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Under these circumstances it is difficult to assess what the
case portends, but it should be noted that in Chapman the
search was not pursuant to an arrest while in Rabinowitz it
was.
Another case, Silverman v. United States,52 may throw
some light on Chapman. In Silverman, District of Columbia
police officers pushed the point of an electronic listening
device through the party wall of a house until the tip
touched a heating duct a fraction of an inch inside de-
fendant's adjoining house. The duct acted as a sounding
board and enabled the officers, who did not have a search
warrant, to obtain incriminating evidence. The Supreme
Court ordered the evidence suppressed on the ground
that the physical invasion without a warrant of the con-
stitutionally protected area of the home violated the
Fourth Amendment.5 3 Chapman may be just another strict
application, as was Silverman, of the rule of law men-
tioned earlier that the entry and search of a house without
consent is unconstitutional in the absence of a valid search
warrant, unless it is incidental to a lawful arrest.
The major impact of the Mapp case for Maryland will
come not from the federal substantive standards it im-
poses as to what constitutes unreasonable searches and
seizures, but from imposition of the federal exclusionary
rule with regard to evidence obtained from such searches.
At common law, as discussed earlier, evidence obtained by
an illegal search is admissible. The Maryland Court of
Appeals adhered to the common law rule in Lawrence
v. State"4 in 1906. In 1928, following the Supreme Court
adoption of the exclusionary Weeks rule,5 the Court of
Appeals reaffirmed Maryland's adherence to the common
law rule and refused to follow Weeks.5 6 The Court of
Appeals having refused to adopt the exclusionary rule of
Weeks, the Maryland legislature in 1929 passed the Bouse
Act57 prohibiting in the trial of misdemeanors use of evi-
dence procured either illegally or in contravention of the
Maryland Declaration of Rights. Since that time a number
of exceptions have been made to the exclusionary rule of
-365 U.S. 505 (1961).
5 The opinion in Chapman expressly pointed out that the decision was
based on constitutional standards and not on possible illegality of the
intrusion as a trespass under local property law. This, however, again
indicates a possibility the Court in the future will draw a distinction
between illegal and unconstitutional searches.
103 Md. 17, 63 A. 96 (1906).
SWeeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
Meisinger v. State, 155 Md. 195, 141 A. 536 (1928).
57MD. LAWS 1929, Ch. 194; now 4 MD. CODB (1957) Art. 35, § 5(a).
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the Act, and there have been repeated expansions of the
geographical exceptions.58  Since the Bouse Act applies
only to misdemeanors, its exclusionary rule is, of course,
inapplicable to felonies.59 The effect of the Mapp case is to
establish a constitutional exclusionary rule for uncon-
stitutionally seized evidence, so that the exception of the
Bouse Act of felonies is at most applicable only to evidence
constitutionally but illegally seized. Inasmuch as the con-
sistent judgment of the Maryland legislature over more
than a quarter of a century since the enactment of the
Bouse Act has been that its exclusionary rule should be
restricted rather than expanded, the Mapp case marks a
rather sharp break with Maryland policy.
The Property Interest In 'Social 'Security Benefits
By James P. Lewis
The American people, and attorneys in particular, have
in the past few years taken an increasing interest in
"Social Security," and especially in that part of the Social
Security program consisting of Federal old-age, survivor's,
and disability insurance.' Although this larger program
8 The result is ,the following situation:
1. Prosecutions for unlawfully carrying concealed weapons are ex-
cepted in all the counties and in Baltimore City. Mason v. Wright-
son, 205 Md. 481, 109 A. 2d 128 (1954) ; 4 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 35,
§ 5(b).
2. Prosecutions for violations of gambling laws in Sections 237 to
263, inclusive, of Article 27 of the Maryland Code are excepted in
Anne Arundel County, Howard County, 'Prince George's Cbunty, Cecil
County, Wicomico County, Worcester County, Kent County, and Talbot
County. In Montgomery County prosecutions for violations of the
gaming law in Section 240 of Article 27 are excepted. 4 MD. CODE
(1957) Art. 35, § 5(c).
3. Prosecutions for violation of the lottery laws in Sections 356
to 371, inclusive, of Article 27 of the Maryland Code are excepted in
Montgomery County, Prince George's County, Howard County,
Wicomico County, Worcester County, Kent County, and Talbot County.
4 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 35, § 5(d).
4. Prosecutions for violation of the alcoholic beverage laws in
Article 2B of the Maryland Code are excepted in Wicomico County,
Kent County, and Talbot County. 4 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 35, § 6.
5. Prosecutions for violation of the Uniform Narcotic Drug Act
[3 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 27, § 284] are excepted in all of the counties
and in Baltimore City. Price v. Warden, 215 Md. 657, 139 A. 2d 251
(1958) ; 3 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 27, § 299.
Mulcahy v. State, 221 Md. 413, 158 A. 2d 80 (1960).
1 Stark, Social Security: Its Importance to Lawyers, 43 A.B.A.J. 319
(1957).
Title II of the Social Security Act of 1933 (49 STAT. 622) is found,
as amended, in 42 U.S.C.A. § 401 if. The more Important of the repeated
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